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We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains
the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction
awards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that
bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded
in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second,
we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner’s curse–driven
model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact
that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies.
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Third, we explore the extent to which the received theories of mul-
tiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we
observe. Our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the pre-
dictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information,
the winner’s curse and the champion’s plague. While the models of
multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts, our empirical findings
also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions that
are of policy and theoretical interest.
I. Introduction
We analyze the performance of multiunit auctions in treasury markets
using a unique data set provided by the Swedish National Debt Office.1
The data set contains the actual bid distributions (demand schedules)
submitted by each bidder as well as the auction awards to the bidders
in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions that were held during the period
1990–94. Our data set consists entirely of discriminatory price auctions.
Using this data set, we make the following contributions.
First, we document the ways in which bidders respond to increased
uncertainty and auction size. Here we focus not only on bid shading
but also on the richer strategy space available to bidders in multiunit
auctions. In particular, in treasury auctions, bidders can submit multiple
bids for multiple units, each bid consisting of a price-quantity pair. The
Treasury hits the highest bids first until supply is exhausted, and in
discriminatory price auctions, winning bidders pay what they bid. Hence
bidders can adjust the total amount they bid for and the dispersion of
their bids in response to market conditions. By documenting these bid-
ding strategies, we make a connection between our data and the pre-
dictions of received theories of multiunit auctions, which focus on such
bidding strategies over and beyond bid shading. In this context, our
sample period is particularly interesting: it includes several auctions that
were held in periods of extreme volatility when interest rates went as
high as 500 percent.
Second, we provide evidence that bidders rationally adjust for the
winner’s curse. In particular, we test the quantitative implications of an
equilibrium in which each bidder submits a single bid for 100 percent
of the auctioned securities at a price that is a function of his private
information. This model allows us to quantify the amount of bid shading
at the cost of additional, restrictive assumptions. We find that observed
bid shading is remarkably close to the predicted values of the single-
bid equilibrium, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use
1 For conformity with the literature on treasury auctions, we refer to it as the Swedish
Treasury.
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much richer strategies. We interpret this as evidence that the winner’s
curse is an important concern for bidders in Swedish Treasury auctions,
and quite possibly in other countries as well.
Third, we use the data to explore the extent to which received theories
of multiunit auctions are able to offer some insights into the observed
multidimensional aspects of bidding behavior. In particular, in multiunit
auctions, the winner’s curse may be more nuanced than in single-unit
auctions: Ausubel (1997) suggests that in multiunit auctions, the more
a bidder wins, the worse news it is for him. Ausubel refers to this as the
“champion’s plague.” In multiunit auctions with private information,
bidders would be expected to respond to a more severe champion’s
plague by submitting lower-demand schedules. We find corroborating
evidence of this hypothesis in our data. An alternative view is that the
primary driver of bidder behavior is risk aversion. For instance, Wang
and Zender (1998) show that risk-averse investors shade their bids more
when there is greater uncertainty, even in the absence of private infor-
mation. But our results do not provide much evidence supporting the
risk aversion hypothesis.
The theoretical research in multiunit auctions is relatively new. While
our data appear to be broadly consistent with some (but not all) of the
implications of models of multiunit auctions, we feel that there are
currently few tractable models of multiunit auctions that place sharp
restrictions on data like ours. This is important in setting directions for
future theoretical work in multiunit auctions since the data that we have
are about as detailed as one can possibly get concerning treasury auc-
tions. We therefore believe that our findings will stimulate further re-
search in the theory of multiunit auctions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the Swedish
Treasury market. In Section III we provide a description of the data set
and some summary statistics. Section IV reviews the empirical impli-
cations of auction theory under private information. We develop em-
pirical implications of the single-bid equilibrium and then turn to the
richer predictions of the champion’s plague. Section V provides de-
scriptive statistics of the data. We break the data up into two exogenous
variables (auction size and volatility) and five endogenous variables (dis-
count, intrabidder dispersion, quantity demanded, profit per unit
bought, and award concentration). We then run regressions of these
endogenous variables on the two exogenous variables. We also test the
predictions of the single-bid equilibrium on average discounts. The re-
sults are broadly consistent with rational adjustments to the winner’s
curse/champion’s plague, and they also suggest that risk aversion is
perhaps not so important. Finally, we illustrate the multidimensionality
of actual bidding strategies by looking at individual demand schedules
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within auctions. Section VI discusses risk aversion, presents conclusions,
and points out some directions for future research.
II. The Swedish Treasury Market
We provide a summary of the institutional aspects of Swedish Treasury
markets in this section. The Swedish Treasury sells Treasury bills, which
are discount securities, and Treasury bonds, which pay coupons once a
year. The Treasury bills are short-term securities that mature within 14
months, whereas the Treasury bonds are long-term securities that ma-
ture between six and 16 years from the original issue date.
The Swedish Treasury auctions are sealed, multiple-bid, discrimina-
tory price auctions. The bids are submitted electronically before 12:30
on the auction day, and the awards are announced at 13:30 (Treasury
bills) and 14:00 (Treasury bonds). Since July 1994, all results are released
at 13:00. Any number of bids may be submitted.2 Each awarded bidder
pays what he bids. Only authorized bond dealers may submit bids in
the auction. Investors who wish to purchase Treasury securities in the
auction must bid through a dealer. There are 14 primary dealers in the
Swedish Treasury market except during a short period in 1994, when
there were 15 dealers.
Swedish Treasury auctions differ from U.S. Treasury auctions in five
major ways.3 These differences naturally circumscribe the inferences of
our study as they relate to the U.S. Treasury markets. First, no Swedish
auctions are conducted under the uniform pricing format. Second, non-
competitive bids are filled at the highest winning bid as opposed to the
stop-out yields as in the United States. As a result, noncompetitive bids
are not part of the Swedish Treasury auction experience. Third, the
Swedish Treasury reserves the right to withdraw securities from the auc-
tion after bids have been submitted. The rejection is ad hoc and is not
related to an explicit formula. Fourth, there is no 35 percent rule that
limits the maximum awards to one dealer. In fact, a single dealer collects
all the awards in approximately 10 percent of the auctions. Finally, there
is no when-issued trading prior to the auction in the Swedish market.
Investors who wish to trade in the securities before the auction can do
so in the secondary market, where identical securities are traded both
before and after the auction, because most of the time the auction is
a reopening of an existing security. A when-issued market has not been
developed for the few occasions on which a new security is auctioned.
2 Bids for Treasury bills must be separated by one yield basis point and, from April 1994,
by 0.1 basis point. Bids for Treasury bonds must be separated by three decimals on the
price per 100 kronor of face value.
3 See, e.g., Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) for a study of both discriminatory and uniform
U.S. Treasury auctions.
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TABLE 1
Swedish Treasury Auctions, 1990–94
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Subtotal
Treasury bills 46 60 72 78 78 334
Treasury bonds 9 18 26 50 50 153
Subtotal 55 78 98 128 128 487
There are two differences between purchasing the security in the
auction and purchasing the same security in the secondary market. First,
bidders in the auction do not know until after the announcement of
the auction results if they are awarded. This is an advantage of pur-
chasing in the secondary market. Second, securities can be purchased
in the auction without paying a commission or a spread to the dealer,
who simply passes the bid to the Treasury. This is an advantage of pur-
chasing in the auction. The settlement in the auction is matched with
the settlement in the secondary market.4
In table 1, we show the breakdown of the auctions over time. Treasury
bill auctions account for nearly 70 percent of the auctions, and the
number has increased over time. The auction schedule is regular and
is announced in advance. The revenue target for the next six months
is announced at the beginning of each semester. The terms of the auc-
tion (security and volume) are announced two weeks in advance. Every
second Thursday, three different Treasury bills are auctioned simulta-
neously. The Treasury bills mature in approximately 90, 180, and 360
days, respectively. On the subsequent Monday (four days later), two
different Treasury bonds are auctioned.5
The median issue volume is 3,000 million kronor and ranges from
500 to 8,000 million kronor. This is approximately 5 percent of the
supply in U.S. Treasury auctions (Sundaresan 1994). The bid-to-cover
ratios average 2.41 and range from 0.55 to 8.38. The average is lower
than in the United States, indicating that there is less competition in
the Swedish Treasury market. The lowest bid-to-cover ratio of 0.55 means
that the auction is undersubscribed. Table 2 shows the number of auc-
tions that are undersubscribed or in which bids are rejected by the
Treasury. Note that 45 auctions (roughly 10 percent of the auctions)
have rejected bids. Twenty-nine auctions were undersubscribed and 16
4 Treasury bills are settled two workdays after the auction, and Treasury bonds five
workdays later.
5 Before July 1991, two Treasury bill maturities (180 and 360 days) were auctioned
simultaneously, and before November 1992, only one Treasury bond was auctioned at a
time. The 334 Treasury bill auctions were held on 125 auction days, 37 auction days with
two securities and 88 auction days with three securities, and the 153 Treasury bonds were
held on 101 auction days, 49 auction days with one security and 52 auction days with two
securities.
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TABLE 2
Issue Cuts
Undersubscribed Oversubscribed Subtotal
No rejected bids 6 436 442
Rejected bids 29 16 45
Subtotal 35 452 487
Note.—The number of undersubscribed auctions and auctions with rejected bids. Undersubscribed auctions are
defined as auctions with a bid-to-cover ratio less than one, inclusive of rejected bids.
oversubscribed. By comparison, Sundaresan (1994) reports no inci-
dences of undersubscribed auctions in the United States. This suggests
that demand uncertainty has been a serious problem for Swedish Trea-
sury departments.
Treasury policy is to concentrate borrowing on a few securities by
reopening existing instruments. Table 3 reports the frequency of reo-
penings. While nearly 95 percent of the Treasury bonds are reopened,
a little less than 80 percent of the Treasury bills are reopened. The
purpose of reopening is to enhance the liquidity of the secondary market
in certain maturities. A disadvantage is that only a few instruments are
available to investors. All Treasury bills are scheduled to mature on the
Wednesday of the third week of the month, so there are never more
than 12 maturity dates within the year.6 The supply of Treasury bonds
is also scarce. There are 12 Treasury bonds outstanding during the
sample period.
III. Data
A. Bid Distribution Data
For this study, the Swedish Treasury has created a tape with all the
individual bids. Each row contains the price per 100 kronor of face
value, the yield to maturity, the volume (million kronor of face value),
and a four-digit dealer code. The dealer code remains constant within
the auction, but it varies randomly from auction to auction. The ran-
domization serves to protect the identity of the bidder. The bid data
are confidential and not available even to the bond dealers. Bids may
be made by the dealers or by their customers, but only the dealers know
whether the bids are customer-based.
The tape contains all the bids for 320 of the 334 Treasury bill auctions
(96 percent) and for 138 of the 153 Treasury bond auctions (90 per-
6 A new “month” is opened when the Treasury issues, say, a 374-day Treasury bill. The
same maturity is reopened two weeks later with the issuance of a 360-day Treasury bill.
The maturity is opened a third and a fourth time when a 180-day and a 166-day Treasury
bill are issued, and a fifth and sixth time when a 100-day and an 86-day Treasury bill are
issued. All Treasury bills that mature within a year are reopenings.
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TABLE 3
Reopenings
New Reopen Subtotal
Treasury bills 60 274 334
Treasury bonds 7 146 153
Subtotal 67 420 487
cent). Nineteen Treasury bill and Treasury bond auctions in August–
September 1994 are missing, as are the bids in a few other auctions.
This information has been lost from the Treasury. The total number of
auctions is 458, the number of demand schedules 5,845, and the number
of bids 28,761. On average, there are 4.9 bids per demand schedule.
The mode is two bids for Treasury bills and four bids for Treasury bonds.
Most demand schedules contain more than one bid, but only a few
contain more than 15 bids. For comparison, Gordy (1999) reports that
the average number of bids is 2.8 in Portuguese Treasury bill auctions.
The thrust of these summary findings is that bidders employ multiple bids
and hence submit a demand schedule as a rule. The distribution of the
number of dealers who actually participate in the auctions is tight. The
number of bidders is six in one auction, 10 in seven auctions, 11 in 33
auctions, 12 in 136 auctions, 13 in 177 auctions, 14 in 100 auctions, and
15 in four auctions.
B. Secondary Market Prices
To estimate auction revenue and the extent to which bidders shade
their bids, we need not only the bids made by individual bidders but
also secondary market prices to serve as benchmarks for the true value
of the auctioned securities.
Every Treasury bill maturity (one per month within the year) and the
most frequently issued Treasury bonds, designated as benchmark bonds,
are traded actively in the secondary market. Trading is organized as a
telephone market. Only the dealers know their transactions. The dealers
are obliged to provide bid and ask yield quotes on an electronic screen,
which is available to the other dealers and to the public; but the quotes
are not binding for any quantity, so the posted quotes are indicative
only of the real quotes. Additionally, the quoted spread between the
bid and the ask is a time-series constant, which is equal to five yield
basis points for Treasury bills and three basis points for Treasury bonds
and, from July 1994, three yield basis points for all securities.
Time-stamped transaction yields and volumes are not publicly avail-
able, so we use the indicative yield quotes for estimating the true value
of the securities. Short-term yield quotes are provided to us by a primary
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dealer (O¨hman Fondkommission), which collects and distributes bid
quotes at the end of the day at 16:05. (We use the median quote of 14
dealers.) Long-term yields are taken from the FINDATA tape, which
contains end-of-day bid yields from two financial newspapers.7 When a
security is reopened, yield quotes are available both before and after
the auction. When a new security is auctioned, yield quotes are available
only after the auction.8 All our data sources provide the bid quotes only
because trading is at, or near, the bid. Below, we shall therefore use the
bid quotes as proxies for the true secondary market prices of the auc-
tioned securities.
IV. Empirical Implications of Multiunit Auction Theory under
Private Information
Treasury auctions are normally thought of as common-value auctions.
The usual argument is that primary dealers buy in the auction primarily
to resell in the postauction secondary market (Bikhchandani and Huang
1993). More generally, as long as liquidity in the secondary market is
deep, the common-value model should be a good approximation. In
this section, we draw out some empirical predictions of the common-
value model, which we later shall use as a benchmark when assessing
bidder behavior and auction performance in Swedish Treasury auctions.
Here, we focus on the impact of private information.
When bidders have different estimates about the postauction price,
auction theory shows that the winner’s curse becomes a preponderant
consideration. The winner’s curse has its basis in the difference between
unconditional and conditional expectations and was originally studied
in the context of single-unit auctions by, among others, Wilson (1977)
and Milgrom and Weber (1982). In particular, if bidders’ signals about
the postauction price are affiliated, as they are in the common-value
model, once a bidder learns that he has won an auction, his updated
estimate of the value of the object is reduced relative to his uncondi-
tional expectation. The reason is essentially that, by winning, the bidder
learns that his original estimate was the highest among all bidders. In
other words, the winner learns that he most probably had overvalued
the auctioned object. Rational bidders take the winner’s curse into ac-
count and submit bids at prices that are lower than their estimates, and
7 FINDATA is a firm that collects and distributes financial information in Sweden. The
newspapers are Svenska Dagbladet and Finanstidningen.
8 In 27 Treasury bill auctions and 22 Treasury bond auctions, most in the beginning of
the sample period, yield quotes from the secondary market are not available until the
next day or, in some cases, several days or weeks after the auction. In these cases, we
interpolate the secondary market yield for the auctioned security from available term
structure data on the auction day.
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the less precise bidders’ signals are, the more they will shade down their
bids. As a result, the expected selling price is inversely related to un-
certainty. In short, when uncertainty is higher, the winner’s curse is
higher—leading bidders to bid more cautiously, thus lowering expected
revenue to the seller.
In multiunit auctions, Ausubel (1997) has shown that the winner’s
curse is potentially more nuanced. This has its basis in the fact that in
multiunit auctions, the auctioned assets can be shared among several
buyers. Bidders now form conditional expectations after the auction on
the basis of how many units they won. When bidders’ values are inter-
dependent, the more a bidder wins, the worse news it is for him. Ausubel
refers to this as the “champion’s plague.” Provided that other bidders
submit downward-sloping demand schedules or individually demand less
than the auctioned supply, a bidder can adjust for this champion’s
plague by reducing quantity at a given price, in other words, by sub-
mitting a lower demand schedule.
The champion’s plague suggests that it is individually rational for a
bidder to submit a downward-sloping demand schedule or reduce de-
mand if other bidders also do so. But if bidders are risk-neutral and
have constant marginal valuations, the only discriminatory price auction
equilibrium that has been demonstrated in the literature when there
are no quantity restrictions is the “single-bid” equilibrium, where each
bidder demands 100 percent of the auctioned supply at a single price,
which depends on his information set (see, e.g., Back and Zender 1993;
Ausubel and Cramton 1998). In this case, the discriminatory price auc-
tion reduces to a single-unit, first-price auction.
In the remainder of this section, we shall first develop some empirical
predictions of the single-bid equilibrium. While this equilibrium can be
rejected in our sample on the grounds that bidders typically submit
multiple bids, it is interesting to ask whether bid shading in practice is
quantitatively similar to what we would expect in the single-bid equilib-
rium. If we find similarity, then that would suggest that bidders submit
demand schedules centered around the single price they would have
bid at in a first-price auction. Second, we discuss the richer predictions
of the champion’s plague. Here, since we do not have an explicit equi-
librium to work with, we focus on drawing out qualitative empirical
predictions. In subsequent sections, we shall empirically examine the
quantitative predictions of the single-bid equilibrium and the qualitative
predictions of the champion’s plague.
A. The Single-Bid Equilibrium
This subsection presents the single-bid equilibrium under specific par-
ametric assumptions, which allow us to draw out testable predictions.
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We consider a common-value auction with n risk-neutral bidders who
have proprietary information of equal precision. Each bidder i receives
a private signal, si, with mean v (the true value of the auctioned objects)
and standard deviation j. That is, where, for all i, has mean˜ ˜ ˜ ˜s p v e , ei i i
zero and variance j2, and the ’s are independent of each other and ofe˜
v˜.
It has been shown by Wilson (1977) that first-price auction equilib-
rium bidding strategies can be characterized by a first-order ordinary
differential equation. Under the assumption that the ’s are normallye˜i
distributed and the prior distribution of is diffuse, Levin and Smithv˜
(1991) have solved Wilson’s differential equation, showing that all sym-
metric equilibrium bidding strategies in which each bidder demands
100 percent of the auctioned assets at a single price are given by the
following equation:
˜E(z )s/j(n)p(s)p s aj Ce , (1)
where C is an arbitrary nonnegative constant,
˜Var [z ](n)
˜ap E(z ) , (2)(n)
˜E(z )(n)
and is the maximum of n independent draws from the standardizedz˜(n)
normal distribution. The last two terms in (1) are the amount of bid
shading, which depends only on the precision of signals and the number
of bidders. Bid shading increases with j, whereas the effect of the num-
ber of bidders is ambiguous.
In these symmetric equilibria, the winning bidder will be the bidder
with the highest estimate, which will be denoted by The price paids˜ .(n)
by the winning bidder equals his bid, which will be denoted by ˜p .(n)
Given the bidding strategy (1), the winning bidder’s expected profit (or
rents) conditional on v is
˜ ˜E(z )s /j(n) (n)˜
˜E(PFv)p v E(p )p v E(s ) aj E(Ce ).(n) (n)
Since
˜ ˜E(s )p v jE(z ),(n) (n)
the expected profit of the winning bidder can be written as
˜ ˜E(z )s /j(n) (n)E(PFv)p bj E(Ce ), (3)
where
˜Var [z ](n)
bp .
˜E(z )(n)
While (3) has been derived conditional on v, neither j nor b is a function
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of v. Thus (3) also represents unconditional expected profits when
Cp 0.
B. Multiple Units and the Champion’s Plague
As outlined earlier, Ausubel’s (1997) champion’s plague argument
hinges critically on bidders’ submitting downward-sloping demand
schedules or individually demanding less than the auctioned supply.
This is ensured in Ausubel’s model by the assumption that bidders are
restricted from bidding for more than a fraction of the auctioned supply.
However, throughout our sample period, in Swedish Treasury auctions
there are no quantity restrictions. Indeed, it happens occasionally that
a single bidder buys the entire auction. Nevertheless, bidders do submit
downward-sloping demand schedules. So, empirically, the winner’s
curse, in its champion’s plague guise, should be important in Sweden
insofar as bidders have private information.
In treasury auctions, one of the choice variables of a bidder is how
much to bid for. When there is no reservation price, the champion’s
plague does not have anything to say about quantity demanded since
a bidder would always be happy to buy at a price marginally larger than
zero. However, when there is a reservation price, as there implicitly is
in Sweden, an implication of the champion’s plague is that a bidder
would reduce his overall demand when uncertainty increases. The im-
plication is that if private information and the winner’s curse are im-
portant, we should see uncertainty having a positive effect on bid shad-
ing and a negative effect on quantity demanded.
Another choice variable for bidders in treasury auctions is how much
to disperse bids. In a multiunit auction, a bidder would like to win some
extra units when bidding by the other bidders suggests that the value
of the auctioned object is high. In particular, if the stop-out price is
high, the inference is that other bidders have information that the
secondary market will be strong and the bidder would like to revise his
bids upward to win more units. Conversely, if the stop-out price is low,
the bidder would like to revise his bids downward to win fewer units.
This is, of course, not allowed under the discriminatory price auction
rules, but a bidder can achieve a similar effect by increasing the variance
of his bids. If the stop-out bid turns out to be higher than his average
bid, the bidder will tend to win more units with a high-variance bid
distribution than with a low-variance bid distribution. Conversely, if the
stop-out price bid turns out to be lower than his average bid, the bidder
will tend to win fewer bids with a high-variance distribution than with
a low-variance distribution. The implication is that we would expect to
see that individual bidders increase the dispersion of their bids when
uncertainty increases.
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In summary, the champion’s plague suggests a richer response to
uncertainty in a multiunit context than the winner’s curse in a single-
unit context. It suggests that it is individually rational for a bidder to
submit a downward-sloping demand schedule or reduce demand if other
bidders also do so. In particular, if bidders rationally adjust for the
winner’s curse/champion’s plague, we would expect that more uncer-
tainty leads to more bid shading, less quantity demanded, and more
intrabidder dispersion. However, it is possible that the champion’s
plague effect on quantity and intrabidder dispersion requires risk aver-
sion or decreasing marginal valuations to generate downward-sloping
demand schedules in the first place. We shall examine risk aversion in
a later section.
V. Empirical Findings on Bidder Behavior and Auction
Performance
In this section, we report on the broad patterns in bidder behavior and,
in particular, how bidders respond to, and how auction performance is
related to, uncertainty and auction size. We interpret our findings in
light of the theory reviewed above and, in particular, we test the single-
bid equilibrium’s ability to explain the magnitude of observed bid
shading.
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 reports summary statistics on bid shading, intrabidder disper-
sion, and quantity demanded, in the sample as a whole and within 10
duration bands. Summary statistics on bidders’ profit per unit, award
concentration, volatility, and auction size are also reported.
Bid shading is measured by the discount, which for bidder i in auction
j is defined as where pij is the quantity-weighted averaged { P p ,ij j ij
bid by bidder i in auction j, and Pj is the secondary market price at the
end of the day of auction j. If all of a bidder’s bids turned out to be
winning bids, the bidder would pay pij per unit. The discount is a mea-
sure of how much a bidder’s bids are shaded relative to the postauction
price. It provides us with a normalized measure of the price level of a
bidder’s bids.
The extent to which a bidder disperses his bids is measured by the
intrabidder dispersion, jij, which is the quantity-weighted standard devia-
tion of bidder i’s bids in auction j. Similarly, qij is the quantity demanded
by bidder i in auction j as a fraction of auction size. In sum, we use the
vector to describe dealer i’s demand schedule.{d , j , q }ij ij ij
In terms of measuring revenue in the auction, a drawback of taking
the average of the discounts is that it takes account of both winning
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics
Exogenous Bidding Variables Performance
Volatility (hj)
(1)
Size ( )Qj
(2)
Discount (dij)
(3)
Dispersion (jij)
(4)
Quantity (qij)
(5)
Profit (Pj)
(6)
Award
Concentration
(7)
Mean .267 3.295 .092 .046 .188 .020 .388
Standard deviation .323 1.730 .317 .092 .225 .270 .340
Minimum .040 .500 1.564 .000 .001 1.067 .015
Maximum 2.803 8.000 3.318 2.145 2.150 2.667 1.000
Observations 458 458 5,831 5,831 5,831 458 458
Duration:
.25 .116 2.572 .014 .011 .224 .001 .547
.50 .172 3.039 .011 .016 .182 .014 .378
1 .189 3.991 .034 .031 .174 .014 .307
2 .259 3.210 .073 .040 .208 .001 .459
3 .334 3.912 .189 .067 .197 .061 .382
4 .408 3.443 .154 .086 .198 .017 .354
5 .546 3.285 .252 .122 .176 .086 .351
6 .600 3.159 .478 .162 .190 .204 .374
7 .509 3.300 .442 .148 .180 .195 .414
8 .888 3.087 .295 .149 .146 .109 .277
Note.—Discount, dispersion, and profit are percentages of face value, quantity is the fraction of auction size, award concentration is the fraction awarded to the five highest bids,
volatility is the daily price standard deviation, size is expressed per billions of kronor, and duration is measured in years. For the 10 duration bands, only means are reported.
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and losing bids. Therefore, to measure revenue, we define the profit per
unit sold in auction j, Pj, to be the difference between the postauction
price and the quantity-weighted average winning bid. A small profit to
bidders translates into a high revenue for the seller. Our second auction
performance measure is award concentration, which is the fraction of
awards captured by the five highest individual bids.
In table 4 and throughout the paper, all prices are expressed as a
percentage of face value. The lowest bid in each auction is excluded
from all estimations. This is a simple solution to an errors-in-variables
problem resulting from bids that are thrown in at low prices well before
the end of the auction.9
Table 4 exhibits two exogenous variables: uncertainty and auction
size. We measure uncertainty as the auction day volatility using an
ARCH(2) process of bond returns.10 The one-day volatility, hj, increases
monotonically with duration and has an average of 0.267 percent and
a maximum of 2.8 percent. This is a very large number: it is 10.5 standard
deviations larger than the mean and has the same order of magnitude
as the stock return volatility of a small firm. The auction size, hasQ ,j
an average of 3.3 billion kronor and varies from 500 million to 8 billion,
but does not vary systematically with duration.
The time-series distribution of the two exogenous variables and the
issue cuts are shown in figure 1. The six plots are organized as the
Treasury bills to the left and the Treasury bonds to the right. Panel a
shows the distribution of volatility, panel b the supply, and panel c the
issue cuts after the bids have been submitted, that is, the sum of un-
dersubscription and rejected bids. Panel a reveals a volatility spike in
1992. The spike is related to the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate
regime. The lining up of the plots on top of each other shows that
auction sizes during this high-volatility period were unusually large and
that most of the issue cuts clustered during this period. The auctions
that were held during this extreme volatility period are studied in detail
below.
The three bidding variables are described in the middle section of
table 4. Column 3 shows that the average bid is shaded below the aftermarket
price. The average discount is 0.092 percent of face value and is broadly
increasing in duration. A noticeable exception is the last duration band,
which has a much lower discount than the penultimate duration band.
Column 4 shows that individual bidders typically disperse their bids. The
magnitude of intrabidder dispersion is about one-fifth of the daily vol-
9 For example, one dealer submitted bids for 10 million kronor at an annual yield of
99.99 percent in each of three contemporary Treasury bill auctions. In another case, one
dealer submitted in writing (not electronically) five bids for 1,000 million kronor each at
2–3 kronor below all other bids.
10 The details of the time-series modeling are in the Appendix.
Fig. 1.—a, Volatility, b, auction size, and c, issue cuts. Treasury bills are on the left and
Treasury bonds on the right.
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atility, and it increases with duration. The smallest dispersion is zero
when the bidder submitted only one bid. The largest dispersion is 22.8
standard deviations away from the mean. Column 5 shows that a bidder’s
average demand is 18.8 percent of the auctioned securities. The largest
demand schedule is for 215 percent of supply. This might have been
submitted in anticipation of prorating at the stop-out price, or it could
reflect a large amount of customer bids. In contrast to the other two
variables, there is no obvious relationship between duration and quantity
demanded.
The two performance variables are displayed in columns 6 and 7 of
table 4. Bidders’ average profit per unit purchased is positive, 0.020
percent of face value, and increases with duration. But the standard
deviation is so large that we cannot be confident that the average profit
is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 1.6). The average profit is
negative for the four shortest duration bands and positive for the six
longest. The lack of statistical significance and the negative profits for
the short duration bands should be interpreted with caution. First, price
movements during the 3.5 hours from the time of the auction (12:30)
to the closure of the secondary market (16:05) raise the standard error
of the reported per unit profit. Second, auction profits have been cal-
culated by subtracting transactions prices in the auction from bid quotes
in the aftermarket. If secondary market transactions, on average, are
carried out within the bid-ask spread, our reported profits underestimate
true auction profits. If we had used ask quotes, average profits would
have been positive for each duration band and statistically significant
in the sample as a whole.
Column 7 of table 4 reveals that, on average, the five highest individual
bids are awarded a total of 38.8 percent of all sold securities per auction.
The cross-section variation is large, however, going from 1.5 percent to
100 percent, with a single bidder obtaining all the awards in approxi-
mately 10 percent of the auctions. Like the other quantity-related var-
iables (auction size and quantity demanded), but unlike the price-
related variables (volatility, discount, dispersion, and profit), award
concentration displays no clear duration pattern, except that the awards
are much more concentrated for the Treasury bill with the shortest
duration than for the other securities.
B. Regression Analysis
In this subsection, we examine the qualitative predictions of the cham-
pion’s plague as discussed in Section IV. We do so by regressing the
endogenous variables on volatility, which here proxies for the precision
of bidders’ signals. The idea is that volatility is positively correlated with
the precision of bidders’ signals, so that a relatively high volatility is
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TABLE 5
Regression Analysis
Bidding Variables Performance
Discount
(dij)
(1)
Average
Discount
(dj)
(2)
Dispersion
(jij)
(3)
Quantity
(qij)
(4)
Profit
(Pj)
(5)
Award
Concentration
(6)
Constant .0194 .0194 .0093 .2635 .0121 .6405
(11.7)* (3.5)* (24.7)* (40.6)* (2.5)* (19.5)*
Volatility .4380 .4404 .2029 .0315 .1080 .0906
(32.1)* (9.7)* (65.1)* (3.5)* (2.7)* (2.0)*
Size .0015 .0015 .0006 .0201 .0006 .0694
(3.7)* (1.1) (6.7)* (12.0)* (.5) (8.1)*
R2 .151 .172 .442 .028 .016 .140
Observations 5,831 458 5,831 5,831 458 458
Note.—Discount, dispersion, and profit are percentages of face value, quantity is the fraction of supply, award
concentration is the fraction awarded to the five highest bids, volatility is the daily price standard deviation, and supply
is expressed in billions of kronor. t-statistics are in parentheses. The discount, dispersion, and profit regressions are
weighted by volatility.
* Significant at the 5 percent level or better.
indicative of a large winner’s curse/champion’s plague and should
therefore be associated with relatively cautious bidding. In our regres-
sions, we control for auction size. This variable may also have an impact
on bidder behavior, particularly if some bidders are capacity-con-
strained. The maximum fraction of the auction size that such bidders
can demand is obviously larger in a small auction than in a large auction.
The three price regressions (shading, dispersion, and profit) are
weighted with volatility, whereas the two quantity regressions (quantity
demanded and award concentration) are estimated with ordinary least
squares. Each equation is estimated separately, as opposed to joint es-
timation in a system, since we lack a theory that imposes constraints on
the estimation.
In the discount regression,
d p g  g h  g Q  e , (4)ij 0 1 j 2 j ij
some of the residuals may be cross-sectionally dependent, since a change
in the aftermarket price Pj affects the discount estimates of all bids in
auction j. To control for this, we also run the discount regression with
the average discount in auction j,
nj1
d { d , (5)j ijn ip1j
as the independent variable. Throughout the paper, we use the equally
weighted average discount. The results using quantity-weighted averages
are qualitatively similar.
The regression results are reported in table 5. The bidding variable
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regressions are to the left and the performance regressions to the right.
In both discount regressions, we see that the discount increases significantly
with volatility. A one-percentage-point increase in daily price volatility
results in a typical increase in the discount by 0.44 percent of face value.
Since variations in volatility typically have an order of magnitude of 0.1
percent, with extreme cases being well beyond 1 percent, volatility has
an economically significant impact on discounts. The positive correla-
tion between auction discounts and uncertainty confirms the empirical
findings by Cammack (1991), Spindt and Stolz (1992), and others. It
is consistent with the hypothesis that bidders have private information
and rationally adjust for the winner’s curse.11
The coefficient on auction size is negative but economically small—a
1 billion kronor increase in auction size reduces the discount by only
0.0015 percent—and its statistical significance is questionable, as seen
from the average discount regression. Our finding that discounts exhibit
so little sensitivity to auction size suggests that the aggregate demand
function is highly elastic.
The regression on the dispersion of bids is displayed in column 3 of
the table. Like the discounts, intrabidder dispersion increases with uncer-
tainty. Unlike the discounts, intrabidder dispersion also increases with
auction size, but the size effect is much smaller in magnitude than the
volatility effect. An increase in volatility by 0.10 percentage points in-
creases intrabidder dispersion by 0.02 percentage points, which is large
compared to the average intrabidder dispersion of 0.046 percent in table
4. On the other hand, an increase in auction size by 1 billion kronor
would not raise intrabidder dispersion by more than 0.0006 percentage
points.
Next, we turn to the regression on quantity demanded per bidder, as
a fraction of supply, which is seen to decrease significantly with both
uncertainty and auction size. A one-percentage-point increase in vola-
tility tends to decrease the relative demand per bidder by 3 percent of
supply. This translates into a reduction in the bid-to-cover ratio of
around 0.39, with 13 bidders in the auction. The average bid-to-cover
ratio is 2.41. A billion kronor increase in auction size tends to decrease
the relative demand per bidder by 2 percent of supply, which translates
into a reduction in the bid-to-cover ratio of around 0.26 when there
are 13 bidders. However, the absolute quantity demanded per bidder
increases with auction size. For example, recall from table 4 that the
11 Since volatility is a generated regressor, may be negatively biased, but this goesg1
against our hypothesis that increased uncertainty leads to increased bid shading and
therefore strengthens the empirical results. Our regression findings are also supported
by regressions in which duration is the independent variable (not reported). Duration is
not a generated regressor but has the disadvantage of not picking up changes in interest
rate volatility.
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average auction is about 3.3 billion kronor and the average quantity
demanded per bidder is about 18.8 percent of auction size. Hence, in
a 3.3 billion kronor auction, the typical demand per bidder is around
620 million kronor. In a 4.3 billion kronor auction, the typical demand
per bidder increases to around 722 million kronor.
The performance regressions are displayed in columns 5 and 6 of
table 5. The profit regression parallels the discount regressions. An
increase of 0.1 percentage point in volatility increases bidders’ profits
by a statistically significant 0.011 percent of face value. On the other
hand, auction size has no effect on per unit profits. Like the discount
regressions, these findings suggest that the winner’s curse is empirically
important.
Finally, we turn to the award concentration regression. The coeffi-
cients on volatility and auction size are both negative and statistically
significant. This is not surprising given the previous findings that vol-
atility has a positive effect on intrabidder dispersion and a negative effect
on the relative quantity demanded per bidder. Additionally, an increase
in auction size tends to decrease relative quantity demanded. Both an
increase in intrabidder dispersion and a decrease in the relative quantity
demanded per bidder tend to decrease award concentration. Hence, to
the extent that dispersed awards are desirable, our regression results
suggest that the Treasury could decrease award concentration without
lowering the price per unit sold by holding large auctions. The drawback
of a large auction is the risk that the entire issue will not be sold.
In sum, the evidence shows that bidders react to a high level of un-
certainty by lowering the prices they bid at, lowering demand, and in-
creasing the dispersion of their bids. This is consistent with rational
adjustments to the winner’s curse/champion’s plague, as discussed in
Section IV. Additionally, bidders react to large auctions by lowering the
relative quantity demanded but increasing the absolute quantity de-
manded. But the size of the auction has no effect on the price levels
at which bids are placed and only a marginal effect on intrabidder
dispersion.
C. Extreme Uncertainty: Case Study
The volatility plot in figure 1 revealed a volatility spike in September
1992, which was related to the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate
regime. In an attempt to defend the Swedish kronor, the Central Bank
raised the interest for overnight loans from 75 percent to 500 percent
on September 16, 1992. The next day, the Swedish Treasury held three
auctions of short-term securities. Comparing bidder behavior in these
three auctions to behavior in more normal times provides an oppor-
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tunity to examine how bidder behavior is affected by extreme uncer-
tainty. The comparison is carried out in table 6.
Columns 1 and 2 compare the exogenous variables. While the auc-
tions in our sample with the highest price volatilities tend to be auctions
of longer-dated securities, the table shows that price volatility is much
higher for the auctions on September 17, 1992, than for other auctions
of similar maturities. The auction sizes are also larger than normal.
Columns 3–5 look at the bidding variables. Intrabidder dispersion on
September 17, 1992, was much higher than usual—about 40–100 times
as high. Measured in yields, the spread between the lowest and the
highest yield in the auction went from 24.25 percent to 50 percent for
the 90-day Treasury bill and from 22 percent to 38 percent for the 180-
day Treasury bill. As a result of the wide intrabidder dispersion, awards
were also highly dispersed.
Quantity demanded was substantially smaller than normal for the two
shorter maturities. Bid-to-cover ratios were only 0.74 (90-day) and 0.85
(180-day), and low bids, amounting to 28 percent and 20 percent of
supply, were rejected by the Treasury. So only 46 percent (90-day) and
65 percent (180-day) of the announced volume were placed, respec-
tively. However, the Treasury bill with the longest duration was fully
subscribed.
The results on bid shading and profits are less clear-cut, in part be-
cause we lack reliable quotes from the secondary market for September
17, 1992. Practitioners have informed us that there were no trades in
the secondary market on that day. Additionally, the high rejection rate
for bids for the two shorter maturities contributes to deflating winning
bidders’ profit per unit bought relative to a case in which no bids were
rejected.
In sum, the bidding at these three auctions reinforces our regression
findings that bidders respond to uncertainty by decreasing prices, in-
creasing intrabidder dispersion, and reducing quantity demanded.
D. Estimation of the Single-Bid Equilibrium
The previous subsection shows that auction discounts and profits vary
with uncertainty, but not with auction size, suggesting that the winner’s
curse plays an important role in determining bidder behavior. In this
subsection, we examine whether the winner’s curse can explain the
magnitude of, and the variation in, observed average discounts and auc-
tion profits by using the single-bid equilibria given by (1) as a
benchmark.
We handle the multiplicity of equilibria by initially focusing on the
TABLE 6
Auctions on September 17, 1992
Exogenous Bidding Variables Performance
Volatility (hj)
(1)
Size ( )Qj
(2)
Discount (dij)
(3)
Dispersion (jij)
(4)
Quantity (qij)
(5)
Profit (Pj)
(6)
Award
Concentration
(7)
90-Day Treasury Bill
September 17, 1992 1.312 8.000 .616 .470 .056 .410 .041
All other .099 2.506 .006 .005 .226 .006 .553
t-test difference 6.5* 2.4* 3.2* 3.6* 9.7* n.a. n.a.
180-Day Treasury Bill
September 17, 1992 1.801 7.000 .062 .590 .070 .771 .196
All other .155 3.006 .012 .011 .183 .008 .380
t-test difference 7.5* 2.3* .3 4.5* 7.3* n.a. n.a.
360-Day Treasury Bill
September 17, 1992 1.211 6.000 .143 .855 .145 .643 .015
All other .180 3.975 .033 .021 .174 .009 .309
t-test difference 8.4* 1.3 .6 5.7* 1.1 n.a. n.a.
Note.—Discount, dispersion, and profit are percentages of face value, quantity is the fraction of supply, award concentration is the fraction awarded to the five highest bids, volatility
is the daily price standard deviation, and supply is expressed in billions of kronor.
* Significant at the 5 percent level or better.
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linear equilibrium, where The nonlinear equilibria, whereCp 0. C 1
are discussed toward the end of the subsection. When we have0, Cp 0,
p(s)p s aj. (6)
The term aj is the amount of bid shading, which depends only on the
precision of signals and the number of bidders; it increases with j and,
for it also increases with the number of bidders. Forn ≥ 4, np 14,
ap 1.8840.
While we can clearly reject the single-bid equilibrium as a full de-
scription of bidder behavior, here we address the more limited empirical
question as to whether the price levels that bidders submit bids at are
in line with what we would expect from (6). We use discounts to measure
and normalize price levels. Under the null hypothesis that a bidder’s
quantity-weighted average bid in auction j is given by (6), the average
discount can be written as
nj1
d p a j  (P s ),j j j j ijn ip1j
where sij is bidder i’s (unobservable) signal in auction j.
12 Hence, the
expected discount in auction j across bidders is
E(d )p a j (7)j j j
with the additional assumption that the secondary market bid price is
an unbiased estimator of the average signal.
Equation (7) says that the predicted discount for auction j is linearly
related to the standard deviation of bidders’ signals, which must be
estimated. Under the hypothesis that bidders use the linear bidding
strategy (6) under which (7) has been derived, the standard deviation
of the bids is the best unbiased estimator of the unobservable standard
deviation of the signal distribution. Hence, we estimate as the equallyjj
weighted standard deviation of each bidder’s quantity-weighted average
bid, which we refer to as the interbidder dispersion of bids:
nj1
2¯ˆ j p  (p  p ) .j ij j
ip1n  1j
The theoretical prediction on bid shading from equation (7) can be
tested with the regression model
ˆd p g  g aj  e , (8)j 0 1 j j j
where aj is calculated from (2) using the actual number of participating
12 The average across dealers is equally weighted since the theoretical predictions are
based on symmetric bidders. Equally weighted or quantity weighted makes no qualitative
difference to the regression results in this subsection.
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TABLE 7
Test of Single-Bid Equilibrium
Discount Profit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant .0045 .0139 .0046 .0127
(.0021) (.0050) (.0020) (.0045)
Predicted .860 1.137 1.192 3.334
(.099) (.143) (.900) (1.263)
F-test 11.0 5.3 4.8 4.1
(.000) (.006) (.009) (.018)
R2 .143 .231 .004 .032
Observations 458 211 458 211
Note.—Weighted least squares regression of auction discount and profit on predicted discount and profit, re-
spectively. One regression treats each auction as one independent observation (Np458); the other treats each auction
day average as one independent observation (Np211). Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the co-
efficients; p-values are below the F-statistic, which tests the joint hypothesis that the constant is zero and the slope
coefficient is one.
bidders in each auction.13 The null hypothesis is that andg p 00
g p 1.1
We also test the quantitative implications of the profit equation (3)
for The corresponding regression model isCp 0.
ˆP p g  g bj  e , (9)j 0 1 j j j
where Pj is the difference between the postauction price and the quan-
tity-weighted average winning bid, and bj is calculated from (3) using
the actual number of bidders in each auction. For np 14, bp
Again, we want to test whether and0.1807. g p 0 g p 1.0 1
To eliminate heteroskedasticity, regressions (8) and (9) are estimated
with weighted least squares using the independent variable in each re-
gression as the weight. The estimated coefficients along with the stan-
dard errors are reported in table 7. In each case, the first regression
treats all 458 auctions as independent observations, and the second
regression treats the 211 auction day averages as independent
observations.
The discount regressions show that observed discounts react to un-
certainty much as predicted by the single-bid equilibrium. In both re-
gressions, the slope coefficients are close to—and not statistically dif-
ferent from—one. The intercept is negative and statistically different
from zero but is close to zero in magnitude.
In the profit regressions, the estimated coefficients also remain close
to the predicted values, and we cannot reject that the slope coefficient
13 The results are not sensitive to whether we use the actual number of bidders, the
average number of bidders (13), or the number of primary dealers (14). For 13,Np 12,
and 14, which is the case in more than 90 percent of all auctions, a is 1.828, 1.857, and
1.884, respectively.
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is different from one. However, for the standard error of theNp 458,
slope coefficient is so large that we cannot be statistically confident that
observed profits increase with the level of uncertainty. While they are
small, the intercepts are negative and significant. Formally, we can reject
the joint hypothesis that and for both the discount andg p 0 g p 10 1
the profit regressions, but this does not change the conclusion that bid
levels (midpoints of demand schedules) are, on average, in line with
what is predicted by the single-bid equilibrium.14
Another implication of (6) is that price levels should be normally
distributed, just as signals are. A priori, the assumption that signals are
normally distributed may appear unreasonable since the values of Trea-
sury securities are bounded below by zero and above by the sum of their
face value and coupons. On the other hand, normality may be a rea-
sonable approximation since dealers’ signals are aggregations of several
pieces of information and since the precision of bidders’ signals appears
to be high— ranges from 0.0032 to 0.9445 per 100 kronor of facejˆ
value—which is not surprising given the sort of securities we are dealing
with and given the fact that many of the auctions are reopenings. To
examine whether price levels are normally distributed, we first compute
the standardized (quantity-weighted) average bid for bidder i in auction
j as follows:
¯p  pij j
z p .ij jˆ (n  1)/nj j j
Figure 2 depicts the relative frequency distribution of this statistic
across 17 intervals around the mean. While the average bid distribution
in figure 2 looks approximately normal, formally a Jarque-Bera test re-
jects normality with a statistic of 7.72. This appears to be a result2x (2)
of excess kurtosis rather than skewness. The standardized bid statistic
zij has a skewness of 0.0429 with a standard error of 0.0321 and excess
kurtosis of 0.1574 with a standard error of 0.0641. Although this means
that we can reject another implication of the single-bid equilibrium (6),
the closeness with which it seems to describe average bid shading is
quite remarkable, particularly given that we know that bidders use much
richer strategies.
14 A critical input in the tests above is the estimate of the common value. We have used
the quoted market bid price at the end of the auction day. If trades take place within the
quoted bid-ask spread, this underestimates the true aftermarket price. In this case, both
the intercept and the slope coefficients are biased downward. Suppose that the true
common value is systematically higher than the quoted bid price and that the difference
between the quoted price and the true price increases with uncertainty. This possibility
is suggested by the fact that quoted bid-ask spreads increase with duration. This would
imply that both the intercept and the slope coefficients in table 7 are underestimated.
Reestimating the regressions using the midpoint between the quoted bid and ask or using
the ask side of the market raises both the intercept and the slope coefficients.
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Fig. 2.—Relative frequency of standardized bids across 17 intervals around the average
bid.
The absence of skewness in the bid distribution also suggests that the
linear equilibrium describes bid shading better than any of the nonlin-
ear equilibria described by (1). For if and signals are normallyC 1 0
distributed, the exponential in the nonlinear term implies that the bid
distribution should exhibit negative skewness. Additionally, if the true
strategy used by dealers involves then the linear model wouldC 1 0,
underestimate bid shading, in which case in (8) we would expect g0 to
be positive and g1 to be larger than one. The fact that this is not the
case also supports the hypothesis that fits the data best.Cp 0
The reason why the linear equilibrium fits better than the nonlinear
equilibrium may be related to the very high magnitude and variation
in the signal to noise ratio in our data. The nonlinear term in (1) is
where is the signal-to-noise ratio. Using the secondary mar-˜E(z )s/j(n)e , s/j
ket price as a proxy for s and the interbidder dispersion in place of j,
we can compute that the nonlinear term ranges from to or152 52,531e e
to The large variation here poses problems for the hy-66 22,81410 10 .
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pothesis that C is positive and constant across auctions.15 For if C is
around to then the nonlinear term would have an economic63 6610 10 ,
impact in only a few auctions. As C gets larger, say around the10,00010 ,
model would be observationally equivalent to the linear model in auc-
tions with low uncertainty; but in auctions with high uncertainty, most
bidders would either drop out or place extremely low bids. We do not
see this in the data. Even in the undersubscribed auctions, of which
there were only 35 during the sample period, the bid-to-cover ratio goes
from 54.5 percent to 99.8 percent. An alternative hypothesis is that C
varies across auctions according to j and is always just large enough to
have an impact on bidding strategies yet small enough not to lead to
absurdly low bids. But this would lead to negative skewness in the bid
distribution, which, as we have seen above, is just not there.
E. Bidding on Many Dimensions and the Champion’s Plague
So far we have seen that bidders typically submit multiple bids and that
variations in bid shading, intrabidder dispersion, and quantity de-
manded across auctions appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that
bidders have private information and rationally adjust for the winner’s
curse/champion’s plague. Thus, in a given auction, we might expect
bidders who are more confident that secondary market demand will be
strong not only to bid at higher prices but also to demand more and
disperse less than less confident bidders.
To examine this, table 8 reports on the interrelationships among price
levels (pij), intrabidder dispersion (jij), and quantity demanded (qij).
Panel A tabulates average quantity demanded and intrabidder disper-
sion at ordered price levels. That is, for each auction we first order price
levels from the lowest to the highest:
…p ≤ p ≤ ≤ p ≤ p .1j 2j n1j nj
The idea is that bidders with relatively strong signals about the secondary
market submit collections of bids with a higher quantity-weighted av-
erage price than bidders with relatively weak signals. We then compute
and tabulate the cross-sectional average intrabidder dispersion and
quantity demanded for each of these ordered price levels. The table shows
that intrabidder dispersion decreases with the price level, whereas quantity de-
manded increases. On average, the highest bidder in an auction disperses
only half as much, and demands about twice as much, as the lowest
bidder.
Panel B of table 8 corroborates the findings in panel A. For each
15 The extremely small magnitude also means that estimating C by regression analysis
is practically impossible.
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TABLE 8
Price Level, Dispersion, Quantity, and Award Ratio
Ordered Price Levels
Dispersion (jij)
(1)
Quantity (qij)
(2)
Award Ratio
(3)
A. Mean
pn .036 .377 .893
pn1 .040 .259 .706
pn2 .037 .220 .611
pn3 .040 .171 .561
pn4 .041 .155 .495
pn5 .047 .156 .443
p6 .048 .162 .367
p5 .047 .159 .324
p4 .047 .159 .281
p3 .054 .138 .237
p2 .053 .144 .186
p1 .074 .151 .133
B. Correlation
Mean .239 .245
Standard deviation .372 .347
Minimum .939 .826
Maximum .712 .899
Positives 28% 77%
t-test 13.8* 15.1*
Note.—In panel A, bidders are ordered from the one with the highest price level (pn) to the lowest (p1). For each
price level, we report the average (across all auctions) intrabidder dispersion, overall quantity demanded, and award
ratio (quantity awarded divided by overall quantity demanded). In panel B, we report the average intra-auction cor-
relation coefficient between price level and dispersion, and between price level and quantity demanded. The t-statistic
tests the hypothesis that the average correlation is zero.
* Significant at the 5 percent level or better.
auction, we have calculated the correlations between pij, qij, and jij. The
table reports the cross-sectional average correlations as well as the per-
centage of auctions with positive correlations. We find a significant pos-
itive correlation between price and quantity and a significant negative
correlation between price and dispersion.
Finally, column 3 of table 8 reports the typical ratio of quantity
awarded to quantity demanded for different price levels.16 Not surpris-
ingly, high bidders have higher award ratios than low bidders. On av-
erage, the highest bidder is awarded 89.3 percent of his demand, the
second-highest bidder 70.6 percent, and the lowest bidder 13.3 percent.
These numbers support the idea of the champion’s plague that the
more a bidder wins, the worse news it is. It is noteworthy that the average
award ratio for the highest bidder is economically close to 100 percent,
which would be the award ratio in the single-bid equilibrium. This may
16 In the few cases in which one bidder demands more than the available volume, we
rescale the quantity demanded to equal the auctioned volume.
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help explain our finding in Section VD that the single-bid equilibrium
explained the magnitude of average discounts so well.
Table 8 confirms what is quite intuitive, namely, that cautious bidding
involves reducing prices and demand while increasing dispersion. An
interesting question is whether these results could be generated in a
model such as the one we used to develop the single-bid equilibrium,
where bidders receive one-dimensional signals of equal precision. If so,
our results suggest that higher signals map not only into higher prices
but also into higher demand and lower dispersion. An alternative hy-
pothesis would be that some bidders have more precise information
than others about secondary market demand. We also have found an
average correlation between quantity and dispersion of .199 (with 72
percent positive), which suggests the somewhat more nuanced hypoth-
esis that bidders’ signals may be two-dimensional. Which of these is the
most accurate model is an important question for future research.
VI. Discussion
A. Risk Aversion
One interpretation of our findings is that bidder behavior is driven by
private information and rational adjustments to the winner’s curse/
champion’s plague. An alternative view is that dispersion is driven by
risk aversion. Discriminatory price auction models by Scott and Wolf
(1979), Gordy (1994), and Wang and Zender (1998) show that risk-
averse bidders may disperse bids if the stop-out price is uncertain, which
it could be in these models because of either exogenous supply uncer-
tainty or private information.
To examine the risk aversion hypothesis, we can look at how bidders
respond to auction size. In large auctions, more aggregate security risk
must be shared among the bidders. Hence, if risk aversion is a key driver
of bidder behavior, we would expect to see discounts and intrabidder
dispersion to be increasing in auction size. Looking at the discount
regression in table 5, we see that dispersion does indeed increase with
auction size. However, the magnitude of the size effect on dispersion is
very small. A 1 billion kronor increase in the auction size raises disper-
sion by only 0.0006 percentage points, which is only 1.3 percent of the
mean dispersion in the entire sample. Even more problematic is the
discount regression. The coefficient on auction size is negative, which
is the opposite of what risk aversion would predict. We therefore feel
that it is unlikely that risk aversion is the key driver of bidder behavior
in our sample.17 The reason why risk aversion seems so unimportant
17 An explicit test of Wang and Zender (1998) gives a similar result.
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may be that the auctioned securities are only a small part of primary
dealers’ portfolios. However, we cannot entirely rule out that there is a
small degree of risk aversion among bidders and that this can help
explain the reaction of quantity demanded and dispersion to auction
size. Alternatively, this may be a result when some bidders face capacity
constraints.
B. Conclusion
We have documented that bidders respond to uncertainty along three
dimensions: as uncertainty increases, bidders reduce the price levels at
which they bid, they reduce quantity demanded, and they increase in-
trabidder dispersion of their bids. Auction size seems to be a less im-
portant factor than price uncertainty in how it affects actual bidder
behavior. As auction size increases, bidders increase their demands, but
on a less than one-for-one basis. Auction size appears not to affect the
price levels bidders bid at and only marginally affects intrabidder dis-
persion. Our broad interpretation is that the observed bidder behavior
is consistent with an adjustment for the presence of the winner’s curse/
champion’s plague. This interpretation is also supported by the finding
that the price levels at which bidders bid are in line with the theoretical
predictions of the single-bid equilibrium in the common-value model.
But perhaps more important, within an auction, bidders who submit
bids at low price levels also tend to demand less and disperse their bids
more than high bidders. In other words, cautious bidding involves not
only reducing prices but also reducing demand and increasing disper-
sion. This shows that bidders make use of the expanded strategies that
are typically available in a multiunit auction. We have presented evidence
in the paper that existing theories of multiunit auctions provide useful
guideposts to interpret our evidence.
Our findings also suggest that it will be of interest to build models
of multiunit auctions in which endogenous supply uncertainty is present.
Many Treasury departments reserve the right to either reject the bids
or change the amount that they intend to auction. The data on bidding
that empiricists collect presumably reflect optimal adjustments by bid-
ders and the Treasury to reflect this supply uncertainty.
Our inquiry has uncovered an interesting puzzle. We have shown that
there is considerable intrabidder dispersion. At the same time, our anal-
ysis has not uncovered evidence that bidders act in a risk-averse manner
in the way they adjust prices. Although auction theory suggests that it
may be a rational response to the winner’s curse/champion’s plague to
reduce quantity and increase dispersion when other bidders also dis-
perse their bids, equilibria in which non-capacity-constrained, risk-neu-
tral bidders disperse their bids have not been demonstrated in the lit-
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TABLE A1
Volatility Coefficients
a0 a1 a2 f1
.0048 .5037 .2264 .0277
(.0002) (.0261) (.0176) (.0007)
erature. A challenge for the multiunit auction theory is therefore to
establish under what conditions such equilibria exist.
Appendix
Volatility Estimation
We estimate conditional volatility with an ARCH(2) model using daily bond
price data. Let Pt be the bond price at time t and A the one-day accrued interest
for a coupon bond. We assume that bond returns follow a random walk with
constant drift a:
P P At t1
p a e .tPt1
The cross-section and time-series data are pooled. The cross section includes
Treasury bills with 90, 180, and 360 days to maturity and the seven benchmark
Treasury bonds in 1990–94. The volatility of the error term is
2 2 2e p a a e a e f DUR  n,t 0 1 t1 2 t2 1 t
with estimated coefficients in table A1.
When a new security is auctioned, there are no bond prices from the secondary
market before the auction. In those cases, we use the prices of the most similar
security, that is, the traded Treasury bill, which matures 30 days before the new
Treasury bill maturity (57 auctions), and the traded Treasury bond with duration
that most closely mimics the duration of the new Treasury bond (seven auctions).
When a new Treasury bond is auctioned, we use the average winning auction
yield to compute duration.
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